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Inner Experience and Worldly Revolt 
Arendt’s Bearings on Kristeva’s Project 
Noëlle McAfee 
Emory University 
This new species of rebels/revoltes are enraged and they have not lost the 
decisive and specific sense of revolt. …They are discovering for themselves 
that there is no answer to the social, historic and political dead-ends 
without a radical inner experience; an inner experience that is altogether 
demanding, specific and capable of fully understanding the complexity of 
the past in order to be able to approach the present and the future.  
– Julia Kristeva, New Forms of Revolt 
 
What is at stake when political revolt depends upon radical inner 
experience? Is the only route to cultural and political change, as Kristeva 
seems to argue, through personal introspection and revolt? If we want more 
from life than the freedom to channel surf, as she says, need the direction of 
inquiry be primarily inward? Need there be an either/or of psychical versus 
public life? Is the only answer to social and political dead ends really found 
by turning inward? Is the micropolitics of the couch the path to freedom? 
“Today,” Kristeva writes, “psychical life knows that it will only be saved if it 
gives itself the time and space of revolt: to break off, remember, re-form. 
From prayer to dialogue, through art and analysis, the crucial event is 
always the great infinitesimal emancipation: to be endlessly recommenced.”1 
In this essay I ask whether we might move Kristeva’s “New Forms of 
Revolt” from the couch to the polis with the help of one of her major 
interlocutors, Hannah Arendt, who reminds us that thinking is always a 
plural affair. I develop a link between Arendt’s thinking and Kristeva’s revolt 
to show how thinking-as-revolt puts subjects in relation to each other and to 
the political. Such a political culture of revolt can engage in the work needed 
to move beyond adolescent fixations in melancholic times. And with it we 
might in fact create more meaning for our lives. 
Hannah Arendt gives us ways to think about democracy and political 
speech and action in a post-metaphysical age, that is, showing how we can 
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possibly make any political claims to each other when there is no ground to 
ground our claims, how we can do that without bursting out laughing.  Julia 
Kristeva helps us think about the precarious subjectivity of anyone who 
enters into the space of appearance, how our own energy and desires help 
us become meaning-making beings, and how the otherness within, if not 
attended to, can lead to xenophobia and even war. Kristeva brings much to 
political theorizing that Arendt neglects, namely the psychic life of political 
actors, but Kristeva largely neglects what Arendt cares about, and that is the 
public world.  
In her autobiographical essay, “My Memory’s Hyperbole,” Kristeva 
recalls her 1974 trip to China during which she found nothing in the 
Cultural Revolution to indicate that it wouldn’t become another national 
and socialist variation.2 “It marked my farewell to politics,” she wrote, 
“including feminism…. I can say, however, that for most of the Paris-
Peking-Paris travelers (Roland Barthes, Philippe Sollers, Marcelin Playnet, 
François Wahl, and myself), this arduous journey, one that from the outset 
was more cultural than political, definitively inaugurated a return to the 
only continent we had never left: internal experience.”  
In that essay, Kristeva sets up an opposition between politics—of 
whatever leftist variety—and inner life. “The psychoanalytic experience 
struck me as the only one in which the wildness of the speaking being, and 
of language, can be heard.” Political adventures seem to her to be ways of 
avoiding the “desire and hate that analysis openly unveils.” Politics to her is 
a way to flee inner experience, especially the power of horror and abjection. 
To put it in another register, the political activist lives in bad faith—unless 
she is also in analysis? But the analyst herself has already said farewell to 
politics!  
Yet there is a lynchpin between inner experience and politics, and that is 
her concept of revolt. Until the present text we are considering, though, 
revolt has been primarily for the benefit of the psychic life of the subject in 
process. Or as Elaine Miller puts it, “She explicates the word ‘revolt’ or 
‘revolution’, terms that formed the central focus of her early Revolution in 
Poetic Thinking, as a search for the past, in a Proustian sense, an attempt at 
anamnesis in which [quoting Kristeva] ‘language…returns to the past in 
order to displace us towards progress. It is the past which prepares a 
renaissance, a rebirth’.”3 For Kristeva, revolt-as-rebirth has been for the 
inner life of the subject. For Arendt, rebirth is very much a public affair, 
something that can only take pace in the space of appearance, in the 
company of others. 
This is what makes it strange to read the apolitical psychoanalyst, 
Kristeva, engage so positively the 20th century thinker extraordinaire of the 
political. Certainly Hannah Arendt did not shy away from dallying with 
hate and horror, though perhaps not with her own internal demons—rather 
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she interrogated the ones that chased her out of Germany, then France, and 
to the freedom she found in the United States, though even there she 
remained “stateless” for many years. In a strikingly original body of work, 
Arendt gave us powerful accounts of politics in dark times as well as road 
maps to the treasure of revolution, of founding something new, not out of 
whole cloth but out of no cloth at all. Arendt understood that the only 
condition we could really call human is one in which we can take part in a 
world with others and initiate things radically new. To start anew is key for 
Arendt and the center of her focus on natality. Further, she developed an 
understanding of judgment: the ability to discern what is right and wrong 
without any metaphysical standard or banister to lean on.  
Kristeva deeply appreciates Arendt’s critique of metaphysics and 
received truths.4 But in her analysis of Arendt’s concept of thinking, as the 
two-in-one of consciousness, she locates a “sort of endemic ‘psychosis’” 
amenable to psychoanalytic interpretation. Yet, I see Arendt’s two-in-one of 
thinking as the door to Kristeva’s revolt: the activity of radically questioning 
one’s own culture’s presuppositions and norms and with it the capacity to 
imagine and constitute new alternatives. Arendt would surely agree with 
Kristeva’s claim that “revolt, then, as return/turning back/displacement/ 
change constitutes the internal logic of a certain culture, whose acuity seems 
quite threatened these days.”5  
Both Arendt and Kristeva call for radical questioning of given norms, 
and both reject the flipside of certainty: nihilism.  While there may be no 
truth and meaning in the world, Arendt and Kristeva look for conditions 
and opportunities to create meaning. So, in place of the prevailing values or 
the absence of values, the task is to create values in the perilous space of no 
certitude.  In a post-metaphysical age, we need to create the meaning of our 
own lives. If we don’t take up this momentous task, we will lead empty and 
perhaps even dangerous (to our selves and others) lives. That he would not 
think was Eichmann’s evil. That we cling to a need to believe is the adolescent’s 
downfall.  
Kristeva’s analysis of the adolescent, the need to believe, the syndrome 
of ideality, and the need for revolt tracks Arendt’s similar concerns about the 
rise of totalitarianism.  Like the adolescent who cannot tolerate ambiguity 
and imperfection and holds out for an ideal, the society prone to slip into 
totalitarianism is vulnerable to the promise of an ideology not only to 
answer all questions but to become the real.  There will be no more need to 
think, for the answers are all magically laid out in whatever grand narrative 
the ideology offers. That Kristeva’s analysis in the text we are reading here 
echoes Arendt’s is no coincidence. Note Kristeva’s description of Arendt’s 
project in her volume on Arendt: 
In the wake of the terror of the totalitarian regimes that 
destroy thinking and life, it is politically paramount…to 
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insist on freedom, which Arendt identifies with birth: 
“This freedom…is identical with the fact that men are 
being born and that therefore each of them is a new 
beginning, begins, in a sense, the world anew.” Terror, on 
the contrary, eliminates “the very source of freedom 
which is given with the fact of the birth of man and resides 
in his capacity to make a new beginning.”6 
It is difficult to draw a parallel, though, between how an adolescent can 
make a new beginning (which is through analysis, transference, and 
“metabolizing the need to believe through the pleasure that comes through 
thinking, questioning and analyzing”7) with how a whole society can. 
Kristeva’s concern seems to be with both: the adolescent on the one hand 
and on the other the society of the spectacle, globalization, and 
neoliberalism.  Kristeva not only calls on analysis for individuals but also 
attention to “the variants of our civilization’s new malaise and the 
renaissance of the ‘need to believe’.”8 
What is this “new malaise”? Recalling Freud’s distinction between 
mourning and melancholia, we might say that instead of collectively 
working through and getting past our lost idealizations, a melancholic 
society clings to what it cannot yet grieve. In her recent book on Kristeva’s 
aesthetics, Elaine Miller identifieses this “new malaise” with our own 
depressed times: 
As the tenth anniversary of September 11, 2001, 
approached, American journalists and artists were 
obsessed with the question of properly representing the 
loss and melancholia brought about by the attacks on the 
World Trade Center…. What does it mean, then, if our 
nation, society, or culture can be said to be depressed? … 
Certainly it seems that something within symbolic life 
must be out of order if depression continues, either at the 
individual or the cultural level, despite individuals’ 
entrance into linguistic and political life.9 
Miller quotes Kristeva’s observation that in France, having lost their image 
as a great power,  “the country is reacting no differently than a depressed 
patient…. People withdraw, shut themselves away at home, metaphorically 
and literally don’t get out of bed, don’t participate in public life or in politics, 
and complain constantly. … French people today, on her account, are both 
arrogant and self-deprecating or lacking self-esteem because of the  
‘tyrannical ideals’ of the inflated ego of the depressed.”10  
Miller highlights two key points in Kristeva’s account of the 
melancholic society, which at first seem contradictory. One is that 
melancholia is a relation between the melancholic and the world that cannot 
be cured without transforming the world of the individual.11 The other is 
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that to heal society, one must heal oneself.  “In other words, although as a 
whole a society or nation or culture may be considered to be depressed, 
nevertheless, the depressed and depressive state of society cannot be 
collectively psychoanalysed or addressed and cure on a mass subjective 
level.”12 
In the society of the spectacle we’ve lost our culture of revolt, thinking, 
and critique. As I’ve argued elsewhere, our neoliberal modes of collective 
decision making invoke formulas rather than public processes of 
deliberation and choice.  Neoliberalism is anti-political. It has no need for 
the public spaces of appearance that Arendt thought necessary to become 
speaking and thinking beings who create new things, including the 
meanings of their own lives. Here surely Kristeva should follow Arendt to 
this other space of becoming a thinking and speaking being where revolt is 
not just on the couch but in the polis. Our engagements there shape our 
world. 
For Arendt, the momentous task of thinking and natality starts the 
moment we are born, entering the world as newcomers, and quickly 
receiving the question asked of every newcomer: “Who are you?”13 This 
“who” is not some identity or essence waiting to be discovered or drawn 
out. Nor is it an empirical matter of an amalgam of an individual’s qualities 
and attributes—of what he or she is.14 For Arendt, the “who” is something 
that emerges from the performance of a life and the stories others will tell of 
it: 
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal 
actively their unique personal identities and thus make 
their appearance in the human world…. This disclosure of 
‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is—his qualities, 
gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide—
is implicit in everything somebody says and does. It can be 
hidden only in complete silence and perfect passivity, but 
its disclosure can almost never be achieved as a willful 
purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of 
this ‘who’ in the same manner he has and can dispose of 
his qualities. On the contrary, it is more than likely that the 
‘who’, which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, 
remains hidden from the person himself, like the daimon in 
Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, 
always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible 
only to those he encounters.15   
Arendt contrasts this “who” to a “what.” Any description or definition of a 
human being is a determination or interpretation of “what man is,” Arendt 
writes, “of qualities, therefore, which he could possibly share with other 
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living beings, whereas his specific difference would be found in a 
determination of what kind of a ‘who’ he is.”16  
So for the “who” to emerge, many conditions need to be in place: a 
space of appearance in which one sees and is seen by others; this is a realm 
of plurality. Also there needs to be a common world that is the object of their 
concerns, their worldly interests: 
These interests constitute, in the word’s most literal 
significance, something which inter-est, which lies between 
people and therefore can relate and bind them together…. 
[T]he physical, worldy [sic] in-between along with its 
interests is overlaid and, as it were, overgrown with an 
altogether different in-between which consists of deeds 
and words and owes its origin exclusively to men’s acting 
and speaking directly to one another. This second, 
subjective in-between is not tangible, since there are no 
tangible objects into which it could solidify; the process of 
acting and speaking can leave behind no such results and 
end products. But for all its intangibility, this in-between 
is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in 
common. We call this reality the ‘web’ of human 
relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat 
intangible quality.17 
Just as Arendt’s political theory shows how the condition of being human 
can be achieved, so too does psychoanalytic theory, especially the work of 
Julia Kristeva who famously named us each as subjects in process or on trial, 
constantly caught up in the rhythms of affect, semiotic eruptions into the 
symbolic as we try to articulate our desires and the meanings of our lives.  
In Arendt’s work, the human condition takes place in the context of 
living in plurality, seeing and being seen by others, speaking and acting in 
concert with others, having a place in the world that “makes opinions 
significant and actions effective.”18 So too psychoanalytic practice involves 
the transference and countertransference relations with the analyst — and 
I’d include our friends, colleagues, and neighbors. Becoming human and 
living a human life is thoroughly interpersonal. Only a monster or a god, as 
Aristotle noted, could live a full life apart from others. 
But Arendt herself rejected any aid from psychoanalytic quarters. 
“Psychology, depth psychology or psychoanalysis,” she writes, “discovers 
no more than the ever-changing moods, the ups and downs of our psychic 
life, and its results and discoveries are neither particularly appealing nor 
very meaningful in themselves.”19 What matters to Arendt is not what she 
deems the “monotonous sameness and pervasive ugliness so highly 
characteristic of the findings of modern psychology” but “the enormous 
variety and richness of overt human conduct, witness to the radical 
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difference between the inside and outside of the human body.”20 Inside we 
are all the same, she thinks; only in relation with the world, through our 
deeds and actions, can we individuate ourselves. We can only become 
someone unique and memorable in the space of appearance, not in the ugly 
and monotonous sameness of the body and its desires. 
Notice the inside/outside dichotomy that Arendt is drawing. Nothing 
internal to our biology or passions differentiates us; only our speech and 
action in the external world can differentiate us. Kristeva stakes her own 
continental divide between internal experience and leftist politics, but for 
her what is important is on the inside, not the outside. Both Arendt and 
Kristeva posit an internal/external dichotomy, with Kristeva valorizing the 
internal and Arendt shunning it. Arendt embraces the political, while 
Kristeva sees the political as a retreat from what is real. And this is what 
worries Kristeva about Arendt’s work. 
To Arendt’s description of psychoanalysis and depth psychology as 
revealing the ups and downs of our moods, whose results “are neither 
particularly appealing nor very meaningful in themselves,” Kristeva writes, 
“The expression ‘neither particularly appealing’ is undoubtedly the most 
revealing here: not only is psychoanalysis ‘not appealing,’ it is frightening. It 
frightens her…. And she goes further,” Kristeva writes, “talking about the 
‘monotonous sameness and pervasive ugliness so high characteristic of the 
finding of modern psychology.’ Monotony or ugliness?” Kristeva asks. 
“Who is afraid of ugliness, of repetition and dysfunction?” 
Perhaps someone with Arendt’s “store of personal and political 
experiences,” someone who had to flee her own country and then later 
escaped detention in a Vichy camp, someone who spent years stateless, who 
learned first-hand that “universal” rights were not universal for a stateless 
person, someone in short who knew the “fragility of human affairs” and 
sought, Kristeva thinks, too quickly to sublimate this fragility through 
political speech and action. Kristeva suggests that Arendt shunned Freud’s 
discovery “that psychic life is a real life only if it succeeds in representing 
itself uniquely—in unique discourse, which is truly a poetics and maieutics 
of each subject. And it is to be represented even to the point of the ‘ugliness’ 
of the ‘pulsion’ or drive, necessarily sexual or deadly, which for the analyst 
exists only if someone has expressed or said it in a certain way.”21  
Kristeva also faults Arendt for failing, because of her neglect of the body 
and the psyche, to note the role of sadomasochism in the political violence of 
twentieth century movements, “this alchemy of fear and authority at the 
heart of the modern, secularized world.”22 
This is an element that Arendt would rather do without, 
no doubt for reasons that one might call personal, but also 
in order to be able to maintain the coherence of her 
thought. It is especially important to her to save the 
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freedom of the “who” at the heart of an optimal political 
plurality, and to not hand it over to some uncontrollable 
unconscious.23 
Kristeva also notes “Arendt’s conception of life and birth, which she sees not 
as biological experimentation but as the ultimate experience of renewable 
meaning. A woman who bore no children,” Kristeva continues, “Arendt 
bequeathed to us a modern version of the Judeo-Christian affection for the 
love of life through her constant drumbeat of the ‘miracle of birth’ that 
combines the risks of beginning and the freedom of men to love one another, 
to think, and to judge.”24  
Where Arendt had nothing to say about the maternal body, Kristeva 
reads this body right into her work. “To transform the nascent being into a 
speaking and thinking being, the maternal psyche takes the form of a 
passageway between zoe and bios, between physiology and biography, 
between nature and spirit.”25 And where Arendt neglects psychoanalysis, 
Kristeva notes a parallel: “To the extent that psychoanalysis questions a 
diverse subject—drive and meaning, unconscious and conscious, somatic and 
symbolic—it finds itself along the same frontier and it helps keep open, both 
parallel to the maternal journey and apart from it, the question of life as 
meaning and meaning as life.”26 
Given Arendt’s abjection of depth psychology and the body, one might 
wonder why Julia Kristeva, the psychoanalytic philosopher of the body, 
desire, and meaning would devote two volumes to Arendt, two very loving 
volumes, the first being volume I of her trilogy on female genius (volumes II 
and II are on Melanie Klein and Colette, respectively) and the other a book 
based on her series of Alexander Lectures delivered at the University of 
Toronto.  But in Kristeva’s reading the body into the political can we also 
discern that Kristeva abjects the political? Or fails to see that Arendt’s 
political is a far cry from the politics that Kristeva endured growing up in 
communist Bulgaria and then flirted with in Paris and China?  
Arendt thought that what was essential to human being is the fact of 
natality or birth, both the birth of the newcomers coming into the world and 
the birth of new events, words, and deeds in the world. The newcomers who 
arrive remind us of this astonishing fact that we can create something new. 
It is only in our own second birth of bringing about something new in the 
world in the realm of human plurality that we become a really human and 
distinctive unique being. This is indeed a process of sublimation, but not one 
of avoidance as Kristeva suggests. The promise of politics that Arendt opens 
up is anti-authoritarian down to its core. It’s a politics even those of us who 
embrace psychoanalytic theory should also embrace. Instead of posing an 
internal/external dichotomy, we can pose, as Kelly Oliver has, a continuum 
from the psyche to the social and, I would add, to the political. In this way 
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our own daimon can be revealed on a couch but won’t really be remembered 
until revealed in the polis. 
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